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1 Introduction
Suppose that two signals are available to a decision maker, and that each
signal contains some information about an aspect of the world that is relevant
to a future decision. In this paper we ask under which conditions these two
signals are substitutes, and under which conditions they are complements.
Roughly speaking, we mean by this that the incentive to acquire one signal
decreases as the other signal becomes available (in the case of substitutes),
or that it increases as the other signal becomes available (in the case of
complements).
Now the incentives to acquire signals depend, of course, on the decision
for which the information will be used. When we call signals complements or
substitutes in this paper, then we mean that the conditions described above
are satisfied in all decision problems. Hence we say in this paper that signals
are substitutes if in all decision problems the value of each signal decreases
as the other signal becomes available. The signals are complements if in
all decision problems the value of each signal increases as the other signal
becomes available.
The conditions that we shall provide will thus not refer to any particular
decision problem, but only to the joint distribution of signals, conditional on
the various possible states of the world. We thus identify statistical features
of signals which imply that these signals are substitutes or complements.
We now give a simple example that indicates how signals can be com-
plements. Suppose that you can observe in a war the enemy’s coded com-
munication, and that you have access to the enemy’s encryption code. Then
observing the enemy’s communication is of no use if you do not know how
it is coded, and understanding the encryption code is of no use if you don’t
have any access to communication that uses this code. However, together the
two pieces of information are potentially valuable. Your incentive to acquire
any one is larger if you already have the other.
One of the main results in this paper shows that, in a particular and
special setting, complementary signals are characterized by a property that is
very closely related to the main feature of the above example. This property
is that the meaning of a realization of one signal depends on the realization
of the other signal. The second signal thus provides the key that is needed to
unlock the first signal. More technically, the result shows that, in a specific
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setting, signals are complements if and only if there is a realization of one
signal that may increase, but also decrease, the decision maker’s subjective
probability that some event has occurred, depending on what the other signal
is.
The result described in the previous paragraph will be shown for a special
setting only. However, we also explore the extent to which it generalizes. We
show that in many cases it is necessary for complementarity of signals that
the meaning of the realization of one signal can be reverted by a realization of
the other signal. We cannot show, however, that this condition is sufficient.
We also explore whether there are cases where pairs of signals are comple-
ments without having the property that one signal’s meaning can be reverted
by the other signal. A case in point is when one signal is completely uninfor-
mative about the state of the world and is thus useless by itself. Yet, as we
shall demonstrate, such a signal might still enhance the value of the other
signal by providing information about the other signal’s quality.
A simple example that indicates how signals can be substitutes is also
easily constructed. Suppose you have two advisors, and you know that they
both work with the same sources, and will tell you exactly the same thing.
Then each of them will have positive value, but once you have heard what
one of them says, you do not derive any additional benefit from hearing what
the other one says.
For the special setting referred to earlier we shall show that signals are
substitutes if and only if they share one important feature with the example
described in the previous paragraph, namely that the value of a second signal
will always be zero. In a more general setting, a related, less stringent con-
dition is a necessary condition for signals to be substitutes. This necessary
condition is that the additional signal cannot reinforce the decision maker’s
most extreme belief that he can have after observing one signal alone.
The results described so far provide interesting, yet partial insights into
the nature of the complementarity and substitutability relations among sig-
nals. We also offer in this paper completely general characterizations of
complements and substitutes. These results show that two signals are com-
plements (resp. substitutes) if and only if, among two other signals that are
derived from the two original signals, one dominates the other in the sense
of Blackwell (1951), that is, is more valuable in all decision problems. We
thus reduce the problem of determining whether two signals are complements
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(resp. substitutes) to the problem of determining whether among two other
signals one Blackwell- dominates the other. This is useful because it allows us
to use the well-known characterizations of Blackwell-dominance, including,
of course, Blackwell’s own characterization, to find out whether two signals
are complements (resp. substitutes).
Complementarity and substitutability of signals are also important if dif-
ferent signals are accessible to different decision makers. We will elaborate
below the economic relevance of the relations among signals that we investi-
gate in this paper in two examples of environments with decentralized infor-
mation. In the first example, we consider a strategic information acquisition
game in which each decision maker can observe the other player’s information
before making a decision. In the second example, we study the bidding be-
havior in a second price, common value action when bidders’ private signals
are complements or substitutes.
Many pairs of signals are neither complements nor substitutes, if our
definitions are used. This is because our definition of these terms requires
certain conditions to be true in all decision problems. This is in the spirit
of Blackwell’s (1951) work. It seems plausible that more signals will satisfy
the conditions for being substitutes or complements if we restrict attention
to smaller classes of decision problems. In the context of Blackwell’s original
work this line of investigation has been taken up by Lehmann (1988), Persico
(2000) and Athey and Levin (2001). The analogous research for our problem
is left to a future paper.
Radner and Stiglitz (1984) consider a setting in which a one-dimensional
real parameter indexes the quality of a signal. They show that the value of
the signal in any decision problems is weakly increasing but not everywhere
concave as the quality of information increases. In particular, a non-concavity
occurs for any decision problem in the neighborhood of the parameter value
for which the signal is entirely uninformative. Non-concavity of the value
of a signal as the quality of the signal improves indicates increasing returns
to scale in information. It may be possible to interpret an improvement
in the quality of a signal as “making a further signal available”, and one
might be able to interpret a non-concavity of the value of information as a
complementarity between an existing signal, and a further signal that might
be made available. We have not yet explored whether we can make these
analogies precise.
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Sobel (2006) considers a fixed group decision problem with common in-
terests but decentralized information, and asks about the relation between
individual beliefs, and group beliefs, or the relation between optimal actions
based on individual beliefs, and optimal actions based on group beliefs. He
adopts the position of an outside observer who doesn’t know the agents’ in-
formation structure. By contrast, we keep the information structure fixed,
and vary the decision problem. Moreover, our focus is on expected utility
rather than the underlying beliefs and optimal actions.
Complementarity and substitutability of signals has previously been re-
ferred to in an auction context by Milgrom and Weber (1982b). Their defini-
tion is tailored to the auction setting, whereas our definition is independent
of the specific underlying economic decision problem.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides definitions. Section
3 contains our main completely general result. Section 4 studies in detail
a binary, symmetric example. Section 5 generalizes intuitive insights that
we obtained for the binary, symmetric example. Section 6 describes two
economic applications. Section 7 concludes. Some of the proofs are contained
in the appendix.
2 Definitions
The state s˜ of the world is a random variable with realizations in a finite
set S. Two signals are available: σ˜1 which takes values in the finite set S1,
and σ˜2 which takes values in the finite set S2. We assume without loss of
generality that S1 ∩ S2 is empty. The joint distribution of signals σ˜1 and σ˜2
conditional on the state being equal to s ∈ S is denoted by ps. For i = 1, 2
the marginal distribution of signal σ˜i conditional on the state being equal to
s ∈ S is denoted by pi,s.
Our objective in this section is to define when two signals are substitutes
and when they are complements. We first need some auxiliary definitions.
Definition 1. A decision problem is a triple (π,A, u) where π is a probability
distribution on S (the prior distribution), A is some finite set (the set of
actions), and u is a function of the form: u : A × S → R (the utility
function).
Definition 2. For given decision problem (π,A, u):
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• The value of not having any signal is:
V∅ ≡ max
a∈A
∑
s∈S
(u(a, s)π(s)).
• For i ∈ {1, 2} the value of having signal σ˜i alone is:
Vi ≡
∑
σi∈Si
max
a∈A
∑
s∈S
(u(a, s)pi,s(σi)π(s)).
• The value of having both signals is:
V1,2 ≡
∑
σ1∈S1
∑
σ2∈S2
max
a∈A
∑
s∈S
(u(a, s)ps(σ1, σ2)π(s)).
We can now offer the two key definitions of this paper.
Definition 3. Signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are substitutes if for all decision problems
(π,A, u) we have:1
V1 − V∅ ≥ V1,2 − V2
and
V2 − V∅ ≥ V1,2 − V1.
Definition 4. Signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are complements if for all decision problems
(π,A, u) we have:
V1,2 − V2 ≥ V1 − V∅
and
V1,2 − V1 ≥ V2 − V∅.
The motivation for this definition is best understood if one considers a
setting in which an agent has to choose whether to purchase either one, or
both, of the signals σ˜1 and σ˜2, and the agent’s utility equals the expected
utility from a decision problem of the type described in Definition 1 plus
money holdings. Thus, the agent’s utility is additively separable in the utility
from the decision problem and money. In this case the utility differences
Vi − V∅ and V1,2 − Vj reflect the agent’s willingness to pay for signal i if no
1Note that the two inequalities in this definition, and also the two inequalities in Defi-
nition 4, are equivalent.
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signal is available (resp. if signal j 6= i is available). Substitutability means
that the willingness to pay for a signal decreases if the other signal becomes
available, whereas complementarity means that the willingness to pay for a
signal increases if the other signal becomes available.
The requirement that the inequalities in Definition 3 or 4 have to be true
for all decision problems is very restrictive, and one may well ask whether
any signal structures satisfy these requirements. We therefore give two simple
examples.
Example 1. States are: S = {+1,−1}. Signals are:2 S1 = S2 = {+1,−1}.
The signal distributions are given by: ps(σ1, σ2) = 1/2 ⇔ σ1 · σ2 = s. Each
individual signal’s distribution is independent of the true state, yet together
the two signals fully reveal the true state. Therefore, these signals are com-
plements.
Example 2. States are: S = {+1,−1}. Signals are: S1 = S2 = {+1,−1}.
The signal distributions are given by: ps(σ1, σ2) = 1 ⇔ σ1 = σ2 = s. Each
individual signal completely reveals the true state. Therefore, these signals
are substitutes.
3 A General Result
To obtain a general characterization of signals that are complements or sub-
stitutes, we define two auxiliary signals, σ˜L and σ˜R. Informally, the first of
these signals, σ˜L, can be described as follows. An unbiased coin is tossed.
If “head” comes up, the decision maker is informed about the realization of
σ˜1. If “tails” comes up, the decision maker is informed about the realization
of σ˜2. Formally, the second auxiliary signal σ˜L has realizations in the set
SL ≡ S1 ∪ S2. We assume that S1 ∩ S2 is empty. For given state s ∈ S,
the probability that σ˜L has realization σ1 ∈ S1 is pL,s(σ1) ≡
1
2
p1,s(σ1), and
the probability that σ˜L has realization σ2 ∈ S2 is pL,s(σ2) ≡
1
2
p2,s(σ2). We
write PL for the matrix with #S rows and #S1 + #S2 columns which is
constructed as follows. Each row corresponds to a state in S. Each column
corresponds to a realization of the signal σL. Each entry of the matrix in-
dicates the probability with which the column signal is observed in the row
state.
2Examples 1 and 2 violate our assumption that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, but this is without
consequence, and could be repaired by relabeling signals.
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The second auxiliary signal, σ˜R, is intuitively constructed as follows. An
unbiased coin is tossed. If “head” comes up, the decision maker is informed
about the realization of σ˜1 and σ˜2. If “tails” comes up, the decision maker
receives no information. Formally, the first signal σ˜R has realizations in the
set SL ≡ (S1 × S2) ∪ {N}. Here, the symbol N denotes the case that the
decision maker receives no information. For given state s ∈ S, the probability
that σ˜R has realization (σ1, σ2) ∈ S1 × S2 is pR,s(σ1, σ2) ≡
1
2
ps(σ1, σ2), and
the probability that σ˜R has realization N is pR,s(N) ≡
1
2
. We write PR for
the matrix with #S rows and #S1 · #S2 + 1 columns which is constructed
as follows. Each row corresponds to a state in S. Each column corresponds
to a realization of the signal σR. Each entry of the matrix indicates the
probability with which the column signal is observed in the row state. We
assume that the ℓ-th row of matrix PR corresponds to the same state as the
ℓ-th row of matrix PL.
Definition 5. For given decision problem (π,A, u), and for k ∈ {L,R}, the
value of having signal σ˜k is:
Vk ≡
∑
σk∈Sk
max
a∈A
∑
s∈S
(u(a, s)pk,s(σk)π(s)).
Definition 6. Suppose k, ℓ ∈ {L,R} and k 6= ℓ. Signal σ˜k is more valuable
than signal σ˜ℓ if for all decision problems (π,A, u) we have:
Vk − V∅ ≥ Vℓ − V∅.
Lemma 1. (i) Signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are substitutes if and only if signal σ˜L is
more valuable than signal σ˜R.
(ii) Signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are complements if and only if signal σ˜R is more
valuable than signal σ˜L.
Proof. For part (i) note that the two inequalities that define substitutes,
V1− V∅ ≥ V1,2− V2 and V2− V∅ ≥ V1,2− V1 are equivalent to each other, and
to: 1
2
(V1 + V2) ≥
1
2
(V1,2 + V∅). But by definition the expression on the left
hand side is the same as VL, and the expression on the right hand side is the
same as VR. Thus (i) follows. The proof of part (ii) is similar.
Application of Blackwell’s theorem on the comparison of experiments
(Blackwell, 1951) now shows immediately that Lemma 1 implies the following
Proposition.
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Proposition 1. (i) Signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are substitutes if and only if there is
a Markov matrix G with #S1 + #S2 rows and #S1 ·#S2 + 1 columns such
that:
PL ·G = PR.
(ii) Signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are complements if and only if there is a Markov
matrix G with #S1 ·#S2 + 1 rows and #S1 +#S2 columns such that:
PR ·G = PL.
4 A Symmetric Binary Example
We now consider the special case that the state space and both signals are
binary: S = {a, b}, S1 = {α, β}, and S2 = {αˆ, βˆ}. We also assume that
the signals are symmetric. By this we mean that they are symmetric if
only one signal is received, i.e. the posteriors if α or β are received are
equal respectively to the posteriors if αˆ or βˆ are received. Formally, p1,a(α) ·
p2,b(αˆ) = p2,a(αˆ) · p1,b(α), and p1,a(β) · p2,b(βˆ) = p2,a(βˆ) · p1,b(β), which imply
that p1,s(α) = p2,s(αˆ), p1,s(β) = p2,s(βˆ), and ps(α, βˆ) = ps(β, αˆ) for all s ∈ S.
Note that for our binary example this form of symmetry implies that the
signals are symmetric when two signals are received, i.e. the posterior if
(α, βˆ) is received is the same as the posterior if (β, αˆ) is received.
Our next two assumptions rule out trivial cases. The first assumption is
that for each realization of each signal there is strictly positive probability
that it occurs in at least some state, i.e.: for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every σi ∈ Si
there is some s ∈ S such that pi,s(σi) > 0. The second assumption is that
there is at least one informative signal realization: pa(σ1, σ2) 6= pb(σ1, σ2) for
at least one (σ1, σ2) ∈ S1 × S2.
Our final assumption is without loss of generality. We assume that:
p1,a(α) ≥ p1,b(α). Thus, if the decision maker receives signal σ˜1 = α and
no other signal, then his posterior probability of state a will not be lower
than his prior probability. This implies that, if the decision maker receives
signal σ˜1 = β and no other signal, then his posterior probability of state a
is not higher than his prior probability. By symmetry, of course, the same is
true for signals σ˜2 = αˆ and σ˜2 = βˆ.
We shall refer to the example defined in the above paragraphs as the
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“symmetric, binary example”. We now characterize substitutes and comple-
ments in the symmetric, binary example.
Proposition 2. In the symmetric, binary example: (i) Signals are substitutes
if and only if:
(C1) ps(α, βˆ) = ps(β, αˆ) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
(ii) Signals are complements if and only if at least one of the following
conditions holds:
(C2) pa(α, αˆ) ≤ pb(α, αˆ);
(C3) pa(β, βˆ) ≥ pb(β, βˆ).
The proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. Here, we provide a discussion
of this result. Condition (C1) says that the two signals are perfectly corre-
lated, that is, if the decision maker knows the the realization of one signal he
can deduce with certainty what the realization of the other signal has been.
Thus, in this case, in all decision problems V1,2 − Vi = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, while
Vi − V∅ ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}, with strict inequality in most decision problems.
It is obvious that signals are then substitutes.
The above paragraph has made clear that the “if-part” of part (i) of
Proposition 2 is trivial. Therefore, the proof of part (i) of Proposition 2 that
is provided in the Appendix deals with the “only if-part” only.
Condition (C2) says that signal (α, αˆ) induces the decision maker to raise
(or at least not to lower) his probability of state b in comparison to his
prior probability for this state. This is despite of the fact that, as we have
assumed, individually each of the signals σ˜1 = α or σ˜2 = αˆ, if received alone
without the other signal, induces the decision maker to raise (or at least
not to lower) his subjective probability of state a. In other words, these
signals’ meaning to the decision maker depends on whether they are received
individually or together: Each signal alone is (weakly) indicative of state a,
but if received together, they are (weakly) indicative of state b. Condition
(C3) is the analogous statement for the signal realizations (β, βˆ).
To understand Proposition 2 more fully it helps to be more precise about
the notion of the “meaning” of a signal realization (σ1, σ2) ∈ S1×S2. Let us
say that “the meaning of (σ1, σ2) is s” (where s ∈ S) if ps(σ2, σ2) > ps′(σ2, σ2)
(where s′ 6= s), and that “the meaning of (σ1, σ2) is ∅” if ps(σ2, σ2) =
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αˆ βˆ
α a a
β a b
αˆ βˆ
α a b
β b b
Case 1 Case 2
αˆ βˆ
α b a
β a b
αˆ βˆ
α ∅ a
β a b
αˆ βˆ
α a b
β b a
αˆ βˆ
α a b
β b ∅
Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
αˆ βˆ
α a ∅
β ∅ b
Case 7
Figure 1: Possible meanings of signal realizations in the symmetric binary
example
ps′(σ2, σ2) (where s
′ 6= s). Thus, in the latter case the signal realization
is uninformative.
For given distributions ps we can construct a 2×2 matrix which describes
the meaning of each signal distribution. Figure 1 lists the seven different
forms which this matrix can take under our assumptions. It is easily verified
that each of these matrices can arise, and that no other matrix is compatible
with our assumptions.
Proposition 2 now tells us that signals are complements if the signal
structure is of the type labeled in Figure 1 as “Cases 3-6”. Signals are
complements if the signal structure is of the type labeled in Figure 1 as “Case
7”, and if, moreover, the probability that uninformative signal realizations
are observed is zero. Cases 1 and 2 in Figure 1 are neither complements nor
substitutes. Note that Figure 1 makes clear that substitutes are non-generic
in our framework, whereas complements are robust.
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5 Generalizations
In this section we develop necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for signals
to be substitutes or complements. The conditions that we present have a
similar flavor as the characterizations that we obtained in Section 4 for the
symmetric binary example.
Denote by qπ(s | σi) the posterior belief that the true state is s if signal
realization σi was observed, and denote by qπ(s | σ1, σ2) the posterior belief
that the true state is s if signal realization (σ1, σ2) was observed.
Proposition 2 showed for the symmetric binary example that signals are
substitutes if and only if each signal is redundant given the other signal. The
following general result has a similar flavor.
Proposition 3. If signals are substitutes, then for every prior π and every
state s there is at least one signal i such that:
qπ(s | σ1, σ2) ≤ max
σi∈Si
qπ(s | σi)
for every (σ1, σ2) that is observed with positive probability; and there is also
some signal i such that:
qπ(s | σ1, σ2) ≥ min
σi∈Si
qπ(s | σi).
for every (σ1, σ2) that is observed with positive probability.
In words, the first inequality says that no joint signal realization (σ1, σ2)
can provide stronger evidence in favor of state s than the strongest realization
of signal σi. Intuitively, thus, the signal j 6= i provides no new information
whenever that realization of signal i is observed that provides strongest evi-
dence of state s. The second inequality has an analogous interpretation.
Proposition 3, unlike Proposition 2, refers to prior distributions π. It
would be interesting to obtain a formulation of Proposition 3 that refers to
the conditional distribution of signals only. However, we have not been able
to find such a formulation. The same remark applies to Proposition 4 below.
Proof. We only prove the first inequality. The proof of the second inequality
is analogous. The proof is indirect. Suppose there are π and s such that for
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every i there exists a signal realization (σ1, σ2) that is observed with positive
probability such that
qπ(s | σ1, σ2) > max
σi∈Si
qπ(s | σi).
Then:
max
(σ1,σ2)
qπ(s | σ1, σ2) > max
σi∈Si
qπ(s | σi)
where the maximum on the left hand side is taken over all signal realiza-
tions (σ1, σ2) that are observed with positive probability. Let q¯ denote a
probability that is between the left hand side and the right hand side of the
above inequality. Consider the decision problem with the prior π, action set
A = {T,B}, and payoff function given by u(T, s) = 1 − q¯, u(T, s′) = 0 if
s′ 6= s, u(B, s) = 0, and u(B, s′) = q¯ if s′ 6= s. The decision maker will
choose T if and only if his posterior probability of state s is at least q¯. The
prior probability π(s) is not more than q¯ because, for any i, it is a convex
combination of qπ(s | σi) for σi ∈ Si. Therefore, without information, the
agent chooses B. By the definition of q¯, no signal realization σi ∈ Si of any
signal i will give the decision maker an incentive to switch to T . Therefore,
Vi = 0 for i = 1, 2. However, if the joint signal realization (σ1, σ2) is observed,
the decision maker switches to T . Because this signal realization has positive
prior probability this implies: V1,2 > 0. It then follows that the signals are
not substitutes.
Proposition 2 showed that signals are complements in the symmetric,
binary example if and only if the meaning of each signal realization can be
reversed by the realization of the other signal. Proposition 4 is a general
result that has a somewhat similar flavor.
Proposition 4. Suppose signals are complements, and suppose there is a
prior π, a state s, a signal i, and a realization σi of signal i that is observed
with positive probability, such that
qπ(s | σi) 6= π(s).
Then there is at least one realization σj of signal j 6= i that is observed with
positive probability, and at least one realization σ′i of signal i such that (σj , σ
′
i)
is observed with positive probability, such that one of the following holds:
• qπ(s | σj) > π(s) and qπ(s | σj , σ
′
i) < π(s)
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• qπ(s | σj) < π(s) and qπ(s | σj , σ
′
i) > π(s)
• qπ(s | σj) = π(s) and qπ(s | σj , σ
′
i) 6= π(s)
In words, the condition on which the Proposition is based says that at
least one realization of signal i alone changes the decision maker’s belief that
the true state is s. The result is thus based on a weak condition that ensures
that signal i is informative. The first and the second bullet points then say
that there are realizations of signal j alone, and of signal i and j together,
such that the realization of signal i reverses the meaning of the realization
of signal j. The third bullet point says that there is a realization of signal j
that leaves the prior unchanged, but if the realization of signal i is observed,
the prior does change.
Proof. Let π, s, and i be as described in the Proposition. Consider the
decision problem with prior π, action set A = {T,B}, and payoff function
given by u(T, s) = 1−π(s), u(T, s′) = 0 if s′ 6= s, u(B, s) = 0, u(B, s′) = π(s)
if s′ 6= s. The decision maker will choose T if and only if his posterior
probability of state s is at least π(s). Hence, without information, the agent
is willing to choose T . By assumption, since qπ(s | σi) 6= π for some σi, there
is some realization σ′i of signal i which induces the agent to switch to action
B. Hence signal i has strictly positive value: Vi − V∅ > 0.
Now suppose that, contrary to the assertion, qπ(s | σj) > π(s) implied
qπ(s | σj , σ
′
i) ≥ π(s) for all σ
′
i such that (σj , σ
′
i) is observed with positive
probability, qπ(s | σj) < π(s) implied qπ(s | σj , σ
′
i) ≤ π(s) for all σ
′
i such that
(σj , σ
′
i) is observed with positive probability, and qπ(s | σj) = π(s) implied
qπ(s | σj , σ
′
i) = π(s) for all σ
′
i such that (σj , σ
′
i) is observed with positive
probability. Then no realization σi that the agent observes in addition to
any realization σj induces a strict preference for changing actions. Therefore,
signal i has no additional value when signal j is available: V1,2−Vj = 0. But
this, together with Vi−V∅ > 0, implies that signals are not complements.
We now explore examples in which signals are complements, yet there is
no reversal of the meaning of the signals, i.e. cases in which the third bullet
point in Proposition 4 is satisfied. We distinguish two cases. Firstly, it may
be that the third bullet point in Proposition 4 holds for all signal realizations
σj and hence signal j by itself is uninformative. It turns out that in this case
signals are always complements.
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α rp (1− r)q
β r(1− p) (1− r)(1− q)
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α r(1− p) (1− r)(1− q)
β rp (1− r)q
State a State b
Figure 2: Conditional Signal Distributions in Example 3
Proposition 5. If there is a signal j such that the marginal distribution of
signal j does not depend on the state, i.e. such that
pj,s = pj,s′ for all s, s
′ ∈ S
then signals are complements.
Proof. Because signal j is uninformative we have: Vj = V∅ in all decision
problems. Because V1,2 − Vi ≥ 0 in all decision problems, the condition
defining complements is satisfied.
One trivial case in which Proposition 5 applies is, of course, the case in
which signal j is of no value when combined with signal i. However, there
are other cases, as the following example shows.
Example 3. There are two states: S = {a, b}. Signal 1 has two realizations:
{α, β}, and signal 2 has two realizations: {H,L}. Let 1/2 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1 and
let r ∈ [0, 1]. The joint distributions of the signals conditional on the state
are given in Figure 2.
In Example 3 signal 2 indicates the precision of signal 1, but does not in
itself contain information about the true state. Signal 1’s precision is high
(H) with probability r, and low with probability 1 − r. When signal 1’s
precision is high, it indicates the true state with probability p. If signal 2’s
precision is low, it indicates the true state with probability q.
Because signal 2 is independent of the true state, its value by itself is zero:
V2 − V∅ = 0. Moreover, it will always be true that V1,2 − V1 ≥ 0. Therefore,
signals 1 and 2 will be weak complements. For some decision problems,
however, signal 1 will be useful only if it shifts player 1’s prior sufficiently
strongly, and this will only be possible if the decision maker knows signal
1’s precision to be high. In such decision problems: V1,2 − V1 > 0. In such
problems, signals 1 and 2 will be strict complements.
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αˆ βˆ γˆ
α 0 0 p
β 0 0 0
γ 1− p 0 0
αˆ βˆ γˆ
α 0 0 0
β 0 0 p
γ 0 1− p 0
State a State b
Figure 3: Conditional Signal Distributions in Example 4
The second case of complementary signals with no signal reversion is the
case in which the third bullet point in Proposition 4 is satisfied for some, but
not all signal realizations σj . In this case, signal j by itself does potentially
contain useful information. We now give an example of this case.
Example 4. There are two states: S = {a, b}. Signal 1 has three realiza-
tions: {α, β, γ}, and signal 2 has three realizations: {αˆ, βˆ, γˆ}. Let p ∈ (0, 1).
The joint distributions of the signals conditional on the state are given in
Figure 3.
Suppose the decision maker in Example 4 observes only the realization
of signal σ1. If the decision maker observes that this realization is α she
is certain that the state is a. Similarly, if she observes that the realization
of signal σ1 is β, then she is certain that the state is b. These two signal
realizations are completely revealing about the state. However, if the deci-
sion maker observes signal realization γ, then her prior about the state is
unchanged. Analogous statements hold for αˆ, βˆ, and γˆ. Finally, considering
the joint distribution of the signals, note that each signal is informative if
and only if the other signal is uninformative. As a consequence, the marginal
value of each signal is independent of whether the other signal is acquired,
and both signals are complements. The condition in Proposition 4 is satis-
fied although the meaning of no signal is reversed, because each signal has
realizations that leave the prior unchanged yet the realization of the other
signal may move the prior, and thus the third bullet point in Proposition 4
holds.
Signals in Example 4 are also substitutes. The conditions of Proposition
3 are satisfied because each signal has some realization which indicates the
true state with certainty. Thus, no realization of the other signal can raise the
decision maker’s probability of that state, nor can any realization of the other
signal lower the decision maker’s probability of the other state. Nevertheless,
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ex ante, each signal has positive marginal value, even if the other signal
has been acquired, because each signal has some realization which does not
indicate the true state with certainty. As part (i) of Proposition 2 showed, in
the symmetric binary example if signals are substitutes each signal has zero
marginal value if the other signal has been acquired. Example 4 demonstrates
how, in a more general setting, signals can be substitutes without being
perfectly correlated.
6 Economic Applications
In this section, we explore implications of substitutability and complementar-
ity in two simple examples. When studying examples, we somewhat change
the perspective of the previous sections, as in each example we deal with a
specific set of decision problems rather than with all decision problems.
The first example considers the effects of substitutability and complemen-
tarity in a game of strategic information acquisition. The second example
considers the effects of substitutability and complementarity on bidding be-
havior in a common value second price auction.
6.1 Strategic information acquisition
Consider two players i = 1, 2 each of whom faces the same (non-strategic)
decision problem. Before making the decision, the players decide indepen-
dently and simultaneously whether or not to acquire signal σ˜i at cost ci ≥ 0,
and then players meet and share the information acquired. One may think
of a decision that involves some expert’s advice, such as health treatment or
financial investments. One player can acquire the expert’s advice itself and
the other player can acquire information about the expert’s credibility.
Suppose ci is player i’s private information, and let c1 and c2 be inde-
pendently and uniformly distributed on [c, c+ 1]. We are interested in com-
parative statics properties of the equilibrium of the information acquisition
game with respect to c. It turns out that these properties depend crucially
on whether signals are complements or substitutes.
For simplicity and to permit graphical illustrations, we focus on the sym-
metric case in which the value of information in the players’ (specific) de-
cision problem depends only on the number but not on the identity of the
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signals observed. Let uk be the value of having k ∈ {0, 1, 2} observations
available. Signals are then complements (resp. substitutes) if and only if
u2 − u1 ≥ u1 − u0 (resp. u2 − u1 ≤ u1 − u0).
We focus on symmetric equilibria in which each player i acquires informa-
tion if his cost type ci is smaller than a threshold cˆ ∈ [c, c+1]. Let θ = cˆ− c
be the ex ante probability with which a player acquires information under
such a threshold strategy. With abuse of notation, we refer to the equilibrium
information acquisition probability θ∗ itself as an equilibrium.
Given a player acquires information with ex ante probability θ, the other
player’s expected gain from acquiring information if his cost type is c is given
as
∆(θ, c) ≡ θ(u2 − u1) + (1− θ)(u1 − u0)− c.
Observe that ∆ is increasing in θ if signals are complements and decreasing in
θ if signals are substitutes. This means that the information acquisition game
displays strategic complements (resp. substitutes) if signals are complements
(resp. substitutes). Moreover, observe that ∆ is decreasing in c. This implies
that an interior equilibrium θ∗ is given by the mass of cost types below the
cost type who is just indifferent, given θ∗, i.e. θ∗ solves ∆∗(θ∗) = 0 where
∆∗(θ) ≡ ∆(θ, c+ θ) = θ[(u2 − u1)− (u1 − u0)− 1]− c.
Furthermore, if ∆∗(1) ≥ 0, then even the highest cost type c+1 has a positive
information acquisition incentive given the other player acquires information
with probability 1, hence θ∗ = 1 is then an equilibrium. Likewise, if ∆∗(0) ≤
0, then θ∗ = 0 is an equilibrium.
Next, we illustrate these observations graphically. Note that the slope of
∆∗ is positive if and only if there are “strong” complementarities in the sense
that the additional value of the second signal exceeds the value of the first
signal by more than 1. Figure 4 displays the functions ∆∗,∆(·, c),∆(·, c+1)
if signals are substitutes (left panel) and strong complements (right panel).
Equilibria are indicated by circles.
The left panel exhibits a unique equilibrium. The highest cost type c+1
would not acquire a signal even if there was no possibility to observe the other
signal for free. Substitutability implies that the other player’s presence only
lowers this type’s information acquisition incentive. Conversely, the lowest
cost type c would acquire information even if the other signal were free. Thus
there is some but not full information acquisition in equilibrium.
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∆(·, c+ 1)
∆∗
θ1
∆(·, c)
∆(·, c+ 1)
∆∗
Figure 4: Incentives to acquire information when signals are substitutes (left)
and complements (right)
The right panel features multiple equilibria. Here, even the lowest cost
type would not acquire information in the absence of the other player. Thus,
if each player believes the other player to abstain from information acquisi-
tion, there will be no information acquisition in equilibrium. Due to (strong)
complementarity however, a player’s information acquisition is stimulated if
he believes that the other player acquires information. Thus, everyone ac-
quiring information is an equilibrium. Note also that the interior equilibrium
is unstable in the sense that a small upward (downward) perturbation of a
player’s equilibrium information acquisition probability would raise (lower)
the other player’s information acquisition probability, which, in turn, would
raise (lower) the first player’s information acquisition probability etc.
Note that the case with “weak” complementarity is a case in–between
the depicted cases. Here the functions ∆(·, c),∆(·, c+ 1) are increasing in θ,
while ∆∗ is decreasing in θ. In sum, when signals are substitutes or weak
complements, we obtain a unique symmetric equilibrium, while with strong
complements, we obtain multiple symmetric equilibria.
In Figure 5, we plot the equilibrium information acquisition probability
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Figure 5: Equilibrium information acquisition probability when signals are
substitutes or weak complements (left) and strong complements (right)
as c increases. This amounts to shifting up ∆∗ in the graphs above.
The left panel displays the case when ∆∗ is falling. In this case, we have
a smooth downward sloping “demand” for information. As costs c go up,
the likelihood of acquiring information goes down smoothly. This differs
markedly from the right panel where signals are strong complements. Here,
small changes in costs might lead to a dramatic drop or rise in information
acquisition. Note also that it appears as if along the interior equilibrium, de-
mand for information could go up as costs increase. Recall, however, that this
is an unstable equilibrium path so that comparative statics is not necessarily
meaningful.
6.2 A second price auction
In this subsection, we study the implications of complementarity and sub-
stitutability of signals if these signals are privately observed by bidders in a
second price, common value auction. In particular, we show that complemen-
tarity of signals may imply that the second price, common value auction has
no pure strategy equilibrium, but that it does have a mixed strategy equi-
librium, and in this equilibrium the auctioneer’s expected revenue equals
the expected value of the object. This contrasts sharply with the properties
of the second price auction in the standard setting of Milgrom and Weber
(1982a).
We assume that a single indivisible auction is sold through a second price
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auction to two bidders. Bidders submit their bids simultaneously. All non-
negative real numbers are allowed as bids. The highest bidder wins the
object. She pays the second highest bid. The second highest bidder wins
nothing and pays nothing. Ties are resolved by tossing a fair coin.
We consider the binary, symmetric example of Section 4. We assume that
the state s ∈ {a, b} represents the true value of the object and set a = 0 and
b = 1. This value is common to both bidders. Bidder i has von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility s− p if she wins and pays a price p, and zero, if she does
not win. To make the problem interesting, we assume that π(b) ∈ (0, 1).
Before submitting a bid, bidder i privately observes signal σ˜i. As in section
5, we denote by qπ(s|σi) and by qπ(s|σ1, σ2), for qπ(σ1, σ2) > 0, the posterior
beliefs that the true state is s if realization σi or (σ1, σ2) were observed,
respectively.
We study the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game. We
allow players to randomize, and hence admit behavior strategies. Symmetry
here means that bidder 1’s behavior strategy when she observes α is equal to
bidder 2’s behavior strategy when she observes αˆ, and a similar condition for
β and βˆ. Thus, a symmetric strategy is characterized by bidder 1’s behavior
strategies. Whenever the equilibrium is in pure strategies, we denote by
bi(σi) bidder i’s bid when she observes σi ∈ Si.
One motivation for restricting attention to symmetric equilibria is that
this rules out equilibria in which one bidder bids very high and the other
bidder bids very low. Second price auctions always have equilibria of this
type. However, they are of less interest than symmetric equilibria.
By Proposition 2, if signals are substitutes, they are perfectly correlated.
Thus, bidders’ conditional expected values of the good are common knowl-
edge among the bidders, and they are identical. It is immediate that both
bidders bidding the correct conditional expected value is then a symmetric
equilibrium. We omit the proof.
Proposition 6. If σ˜1 and σ˜2 are substitutes, then there exists a symmet-
ric equilibrium in pure strategies characterized by: b1(α) = qπ(b|α, αˆ), and
b1(β) = qπ(b|β, βˆ).
Note that the equilibrium described in Proposition 6 implies that the
price paid to the auctioneer is identical to the true value of the good, and
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thus fully reveals the bidders’ private information. The auctioneer achieves
the maximum revenue that is compatible with individual rationality.
Next, we consider the case that σ˜1 and σ˜2 are complements. If each
individual signal is by itself uninformative, as in Example 1, then it is again
easy to find a symmetric equilibrium: each bidder bids the ex ante expected
value of the good.
Proposition 7. If signals are complements and individually uninformative,
there is a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies characterized by: b1(α) =
b1(β) = π(b).
We omit the proof of Proposition 7. It maybe worthwhile to compare
the strategies in Proposition 7 to the equilibrium strategies in a two bidder
second price, common value auction that have been described in Milgrom
and Weber (1982a). According to these strategies, in a symmetric, affiliated
signals set-up, each bidder i bids the value that the good would have if the
other bidder had the same signal as bidder i. Each bidder’s bid thus reveals
that bidder’s signal. The winning bidder has a positive surplus, and the
auctioneer’s expected revenue is less than the expected true value of the
good. By contrast, in the equilibrium in Proposition 7, the price does not
reveal bidders’ signals. Yet, the auctioneer’s revenue equals the expected
value of the good, and is the maximum expected revenue compatible with
individual rationality.
It remains to consider the case in which signals are complements and
individually informative. We assume that (σ˜1, σ˜2) has full support conditional
on each state. Moreover, we only consider Cases 3 and 5 of Figure 1. When
(C2) of Proposition 2 holds, then generically Case 3 applies, and when (C3)
of Proposition 2 holds, then generically Case 5 applies. Finally, we assume
that each signal is informative by itself: pa(α) 6= pb(α).
Proposition 8. If (σ˜1, σ˜2) has full support, both signals are informative by
themselves, and Cases 3 or 5 of Figure 1 apply, there is no symmetric equi-
librium in pure strategies.
Note the contrast between Proposition 8 and the case discussed by Mil-
grom and Weber (1982a). In Milgrom and Weber’s (1982a) symmetric model
with affiliated signals the second price auction always has a symmetric Bayesian
equilibrium in pure strategies. Intuitively, the reason why a similar existence
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result does not apply in Cases 3 and 5 in our model is that in those cases the
signals are not well-ordered. Whether α or β indicates a high or a low value
depends on the realization of the signal of the other bidder. By contrast,
in Milgrom and Weber (1982a), signals are well-ordered. Their meaning is
independent of the other agents’ signals.
Proof. Any symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies would have to satisfy
the following condition: if bidder 1 bids p when she observes σ1, the expected
value of the good conditional on σ˜1 = σ1 and conditional on bidder 2 bidding
p when she uses the symmetric bid function must be equal to p. To see
why, note that otherwise, bidder 1 would have incentives to deviate. For
instance, suppose that the above conditional expected value is less than p.
Then, bidder 1 gets negative expected utility when she observes σ1, bidder 2
bids p, both tie and bidder 1 wins. Thus, bidder 1 can improve by bidding
p−ε when she observes σ1 for ε > 0 and ε small enough. This deviation only
affects bidder 1’s payoffs when bidder 1 ties in the above situation. A similar
argument applies when bidder 1 obtains positive expected utility conditional
on the event that she observes σ1, bidder 2 bids p, both tie and bidder 1
wins.
Next, note that in a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which
b1(α) = b1(β), the event that bidder 2 submits the same p does not provide
information about her private signal. Thus, our necessary condition becomes
b1(σ1) = qπ(b|σ1), for σ1 ∈ {α, β}, which together with b1(α) = b1(β) gives
us a contradiction with our assumption that the signals are individually in-
formative.
Consider next a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies in which b1(α) 6=
b1(β). Both bidders submit the same bid only if they observe the same
signal realization. Thus, our necessary condition becomes b1(α) = qπ(b|α, αˆ)
and b1(β) = qπ(b|β, βˆ). We show next that if the bid function satisfies this
condition, it must also satisfy that:
qπ(b|β, αˆ) ∈ [min{b1(α), b1(β)},max{b1(α), b1(β)}].
To see why, suppose, for instance, that qπ(b|β, αˆ) < min{b1(α), b1(β)}. Then
bidder 1 obtains zero expected utility if she and bidder 2 submits the higher
bid. However, bidder 1 gets negative expected utility if she submits her
higher bid and bidder 2 her lower bid. This is because the expected value
of the good conditional on this event is equal to qπ(b|β, αˆ), which by our
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starting assumption is less than bidder 2’s bid. As a consequence, bidder 1
has an incentive to deviate and submit a bid that loses with probability one.
The argument for qπ(b|β, αˆ) > max{b1(α), b1(β)} is similar. In this case,
bidder 1 has an incentive to replace her lower bid by a bid that allows her to
win with probability one.
But now observe that the condition that we have derived in the previous
paragraph is incompatible with complementary signals. In Case 3 of Figure
1 we have that qπ(b|β, αˆ) < max{b1(α), b1(β)}, and in Case 5 of Figure 1 we
have that qπ(b|β, αˆ) > max{b1(α), b1(β)}. Thus, there cannot be a symmetric
equilibrium in pure strategies.
While the second price auction does not have symmetric Bayesian equilib-
ria in pure strategies when signals are complements, it does have symmetric
Bayesian equilibria in mixed strategies in this case, as our next result shows.
The proof of this result is in the Appendix. While it is not surprising that
a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies exists, it is surprising
that in Case 3 the second price auction extracts all the bidders’ surplus as
revenue for the auctioneer. In Case 5, by contrast, the bidders have positive
expected surplus.
Proposition 9. If (σ˜1, σ˜2) has full support, both signals are informative by
themselves, and Cases 3 or 5 of Figure 1 apply, there is a symmetric equilib-
rium in behavior strategies with the following properties:
(i) When Case 3 applies:
– Bidder 1 bids p∗ with probability one, if she observes α;
– Bidder 1 bids p∗ with probability k∗ and qπ(b|β, βˆ) with probability
1− k∗, if she observes β;
for a p∗ ∈ (qπ(b|α, βˆ),min{qπ(b|α, αˆ), qπ(b|β, βˆ)}) and k
∗ ∈ (0, 1). In
this equilibrium, each bidder’s ex ante expected utility equals zero, and
the auctioneer’s ex ante expected revenue equals the unconditional ex-
pected value of s˜, E[s˜].
(ii) When Case 5 applies:
– Bidder 1 bids qπ(b|α, αˆ) with probability
1
k∗
and p∗ with probability
1− 1
k∗
, if she observes α;
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– Bidder 1 bids p∗ with probability one, if she observes β;
for a p∗ ∈ (min{qπ(b|α, αˆ), qπ(b|β, βˆ)}, qπ(b|α, βˆ)) and
1
k∗
∈ (0, 1). In
this equilibrium, each bidder’s ex ante expected utility is strictly greater
than zero, and the auctioneer’s ex ante expected revenue is strictly less
than the unconditional expected value of s˜, E[s˜].
It is easy to see the technical reason why the equilibrium in Proposition
9 must have the property that bidders’ expected surplus is zero in Case 3. In
Case 3, for low and for high signals, bidders make with positive probability
the lowest bid that any bidder makes in the auction. Their expected utility
must therefore equal the expected utility of this lowest bid. This bid can only
win when when it ties. Its expected utility must be zero because otherwise
a bidder would have an incentive to change her bid slightly to break the tie.
In a monotone equilibrium in which high signal bidders submit higher
bids than low signal bidders, high signal bidders can obtain positive surplus
only when their bid, and therefore their signal, is strictly larger than that of
low signal bidders. This means that, ex post, the news is “mixed.” In our
model, in Case 3, mixed news gives the lowest conditional expected value
possible. In contrast to Case 3, in Case 5 mixed news gives the highest
conditional expected value possible. This may be the intuitive reason why
in Case 3 the high signal bidder does not obtain strictly positive expected
utility, whereas in Case 5 she does.
Note that we have not proved that there is a unique symmetric equilib-
rium. We conjecture that the equilibria are unique.
7 Conclusion
This paper has provided some insights into the nature of complementar-
ity and substitutability relations among signals, but many questions remain
open. Firstly, we have not been able to determine to which extent the intu-
itive insights of Section 4 generalize. Our results in Section 5 are only partial.
Secondly, whereas in this paper we have sought characterizations that imply
substitutability or complementarity in all decision problems, one might re-
strict attention to smaller classes of decision problems as they typically arise
in economics, for example to monotone decision problems as in Athey and
Levin (2001).
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Complementarity and substitutability relations among signals may mat-
ter in economic contexts where agents hold private signals, and each agents’
preferences depend on all signals, that is, in contexts with interdependent
preferences. Such contexts arise naturally in auctions or in voting games. It
seems worthwhile to explore the implications of complementarity and substi-
tutability in those contexts.
Complementarity of signals may also matter when agents acquire signals
sequentially. In this case, the second signal may be acquired when the agent
already knows the realization of the first signal. By contrast, in our setting,
each signal is acquired without knowing the realization of the other signal.
Extending our results to a setting where agents evaluate signals knowing the
realization of other signals is another project for future work.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by introducing additional notation. Throughout we shall assume
that the probability distributions pa and pb are given and fixed. For given
prior distribution π, for i ∈ {1, 2} and σi ∈ Si, we denote by qπ(σi) the
prior probability of observing σi, i.e. qπ(σi) = π(a)pi,a(σi) + π(b)pi,b(σi). For
given prior probability distribution π, and for i ∈ {1, 2} and σi ∈ Si we
denote by qπ(s | σi) the conditional probability of state s if signal realization
σi is observed. Note that our assumption that for every signal realization
there is a state in which this signal realization is observed with positive
probability implies that these conditional probabilities are all well-defined.
Finally, consider a joint realization of both signals, (σ1, σ2) ∈ S1×S2. If there
is a state in which this joint realization is observed with positive probability,
then we write qπ(s | σ1, σ2) for the conditional probability of state s if the
prior is π, and the joint signal realization (σ1, σ2) is observed.
Part (i): As mentioned in the main text, the “if-part” of part (i) of Propo-
sition 2 is obvious. Therefore, we focus on the “only if-part”. We proceed in
two steps.
Step 1: We show that substitutability of the two signals implies that there
is a λ ≥ 0 such that:
(pb(α, αˆ), pb(α, βˆ)) = λ(pa(α, αˆ), pa(α, βˆ)). (1)
Intuitively, this equality says that when the decision maker receives signal
σ1 = α, then his or her beliefs will be the same when the second signal is
σ2 = αˆ and when it is σ2 = βˆ. Before we proceed to the proof, we note that
if (1) is true, symmetry implies:
(pb(α, αˆ), pb(β, αˆ)) = λ(pa(α, αˆ), pa(β, αˆ)). (2)
Moreover, arguments analogous to those that we use below to show (1) also
prove that there is a γ ≥ 0 such that:
(pb(β, αˆ), pb(β, βˆ)) = γ(pa(β, αˆ), pa(β, βˆ)); (3)
(pb(α, βˆ), pb(β, βˆ)) = γ(pa(α, βˆ), pa(β, βˆ)). (4)
To prove (1) we now distinguish two cases.
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Case 1: Suppose that there is only one σ2 ∈ S2 such that pa(α, σ2) > 0.
Our proof of the assertion is indirect. The condition which we seek to prove
can only be violated if pb(α, σ
′
2) > 0 for σ
′
2 6= σ2. Consider the prior π given
by: π(a) = π(b) = 0.5. The posterior probability of state a after receiving
signal α is less than the posterior probability of state a after receiving signal
(α, σ2):
qπ(a | α) < qπ(a | α, σ2).
Pick some number x strictly between these two posterior probabilities, and
consider the following decision problem. The set of actions is: A = {T,B}.
The payoff function u is defined in Figure A1.
a b
T 1− x 0
B 0 x
Figure A1: A payoff function
Observe that the decision maker will choose action T if and only if his poste-
rior probability of state a is at least x. Now suppose x > 0.5. Then, without
any information, the decision maker will choose B. Now suppose the decision
maker had only signal σ˜1 available. No realization of signal 1 can convince
the decision maker to switch to action T . Indeed, if σ˜1 = β, then the decision
maker revises his prior probability of state a (weakly) downwards. Thus, he
will choose B. On the other hand, if σ˜1 = α, then by construction of x the
posterior probability of a is below x. Again, the decision maker will choose
B. Because no realization of σ˜1 can convince the decision maker to change
his choice in comparison to the case in which he receives no signal, we have:
V1 − V∅ = 0.
On the other hand, if the decision maker receives two signals, then for
some realizations of the signal he changes his action. Specifically, if the
decision maker observes (α, σ2), then the probability which he attaches to a
rises above x, and he will choose T . Therefore, with positive probability, two
signals together will have a realization that induces the decision maker to
change his action. This implies: V1,2− V∅ > 0. Because: V1,2− V1 > V1− V∅,
we have obtained a contradiction to substitutability.
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Case 2: We have pa(α, αˆ) > 0 and pa(α, βˆ) > 0. We prove our assertion
indirectly. Our assertion is violated if and only if:
pb(α, αˆ)
pa(α, αˆ)
6=
pb(α, βˆ)
pa(α, βˆ)
.
Suppose the left hand side were smaller than the right hand side. Then signal
(α, αˆ) raises the posterior probability of state a to a higher level than signal
σ1 = α alone. Thus, we can repeat the construction displayed in Case 1 and
obtain a contradiction to substitutability. The same argument works if the
right hand side is smaller than the left hand side.
Step 2: We now deduce from equations (1)-(4) that Condition (C1) in
Proposition 2 must hold. Suppose that pa(α, βˆ) > 0. Then we would have
λ = γ because by (1):
pb(α, βˆ) = λpa(α, βˆ),
and by (4):
pb(α, βˆ) = γpa(α, βˆ).
Thus, we would conclude from (1)-(4) that pa(σ1, σ2) = pb(σ1, σ2) for all
(σ1, σ2) ∈ S1 × S2. But this contradicts our assumption that at least some
signal realization is informative. We can thus conclude that pa(α, βˆ) = 0. By
symmetry: pa(β, αˆ) = 0. By equations (1) and (2) this implies: pb(α, βˆ) =
pb(β, αˆ) = 0.
Part (ii): We begin by showing that the assertion is rather trivially true if
ps(α, βˆ) = ps(β, αˆ) = 0 for both s ∈ {a, b}, i.e. condition (C1) holds. The
trivial way in which the assertion is true is that if this condition is true,
signals cannot be complements, nor can conditions (C2) or condition (C3)
be satisfied.
Lemma 2. Suppose ps(α, βˆ) = ps(β, αˆ) = 0 for s ∈ {a, b}. Then the signals
are not complements. Moreover, neither condition (C2) nor condition (C3)
holds.
Proof. Suppose ps(α, βˆ) = ps(β, αˆ) = 0 for s ∈ {a, b}. Then signals are
perfectly correlated. As explained in the main text, this implies that the value
of a second signal, if one signal has already been observed, is zero. Moreover,
because by assumption at least some signal realization is informative, the
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value of one signal is in some decision problems positive. Therefore, the
signals cannot be complements.
Now suppose either (C2) or (C3) were true. By assumption pi,a(α) ≥
pi,b(α) and pi,a(β) ≤ pi,b(β). Because at least one of (C2) and (C3) holds,
one of these inequalities has to hold with equality. Because probabilities add
up to one, both inequalities then hold with equality. This implies that all
signal realizations occur with the same probability in both states, and hence
that all signals are uninformative. We have ruled this out by assumption.
Thus we have obtained a contradiction.
Lemmas 2 implies that it is sufficient to prove part (ii) of Proposition 2
for the case that there is at least one state s such that ps(α, βˆ) > 0. We shall
make this assumption from now on without further mentioning.
In Lemmas 3 and 4 below we show that only a restricted class of decision
problems needs to be considered when proving complementarity of signals.
Lemma 3. In the symmetric, binary example, two signals are complements
if and only if they are complements for all decision problems with two actions.
Proof. The “only if”-part of Lemma 3 is obvious. We only prove the “if-part”.
Thus, suppose that two signals are complements in all decision problems with
two actions only, and consider any arbitrary decision problem (π,A, u). We
aim to show that: V1,2 − V1 ≥ V2 − V∅. Note that this is sufficient, because
symmetry then implies that V1,2 − V2 ≥ V1 − V∅ is also true.
Starting from the given decision problem we construct a new decision
problem (π¯, A¯, u¯) as follows. Let π¯ = π. Define A¯ to be a subset of A
that consists of two actions, and that includes one action that is optimal
in (π,A, u) if signal σ1 = α is received, and one action that is optimal in
(π,A, u) if signal σ1 = β is received. Finally, define u¯ to be the restriction of
u to domain A¯× S.
Denote the signal values in the new decision problem by V ∅, V 1, V 2, and
V 1,2. By assumption the two signals are complements in all two action deci-
sion problems. Therefore:
V 1,2 − V 1 ≥ V 2 − V ∅. (5)
Observe that by construction:
V ∅ ≤ V∅, V 1 = V1, V 2 = V2, and V 1,2 ≤ V1,2. (6)
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The two inequalities in (6) are true because the decision problem (π¯, A¯, u¯)
differs from the decision problem (π,A, u) only in that fewer actions are
available. Therefore, values can only fall, but not rise. The two equalities
in (6) are true because the actions in A that are optimal for the two signal
realizations α and β (or, symmetrically, αˆ and βˆ) are also contained in A¯.
Equations (5) and (6) imply:
V1,2 − V1 ≥ V2 − V∅.
which is what we sought to prove.
Lemma 4. In the symmetric, binary example, two signals are complements
if and only if they are complements in decision problems with two actions
where A = {T,B}, and where the utility function u is given by Figure A2
with x ∈ (0, 1).
a b
T 1− x 0
B 0 x
Figure A2: A payoff function
Proof. The “only if-part” of Lemma 4 is obvious. We prove the “if-part”
only. Suppose that the complementarity condition is satisfied in all decision
problems of the sort described in Lemma 4. We want to prove that it is then
satisfied in all decision problems. By Lemma 3 it is sufficient to consider
decision problems where the action set A has only two elements. Without
loss of generality we set: A = {T,B}.
We first note that we need not consider decision problems in which either
u(T, s) ≥ u(B, s) for both s ∈ S, or the reverse holds for both s ∈ S. In
such decision problems differences between the values of different signals are
always zero because an optimal action that is independent of the state can
be found. Thus, the complementarity conditions are trivially satisfied. In
our proof we shall now focus on the case in which u(T, a) > u(B, a) and
u(B, b) > u(T, b). The reverse case can be treated similarly.
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By Lemma 1 it is sufficient to show that the signal σ˜R is more valuable
than the signal σ˜L. This is the case if and only if:
∑
σR∈SR
max{u(T, a)pR,a(σR)π(a) + u(T, b)pR,b(σR)π(b),
u(B, a)pR,a(σR)π(a) + u(B, b)pR,b(σR)π(b)} ≥∑
σL∈SL
max{u(T, a)pL,a(σL)π(a) + u(T, b)pL,b(σL)π(b),
u(B, a)pL,a(σL)π(a) + u(B, b)pL,b(σL)π(b)}.
Now we subtract u(B, a)π(a) + u(T, b)π(b) on both sides of this inequality
and re-arrange terms to obtain:
∑
σR∈SR
max{π(a)(u(T, a)− u(B, a))pR,a(σR),
π(b)(u(B, b)− u(T, b))pR,b(σR)} ≥∑
σL∈SL
max{π(a)(u(T, a)− u(B, a))pL,a(σL),
π(b)(u(B, b)− u(T, b))pL,b(σL)}. (7)
Finally, we divide both sides of this equation by (u(T, a)−u(B, a))+(u(B, b)−
u(T, b)). By our assumptions, this expression is positive. To simplify notation
we define:
xˆ ≡
u(T, a)− u(B, a)
(u(T, a)− u(B, a)) + (u(B, b)− u(T, b))
.
Equation (7) is then equivalent to:
∑
σR∈SR
max{π(a)xˆpR,a(σR), π(b)(1− xˆ)pR,b(σR)} ≥
∑
σL∈SL
max{π(a)xˆpL,a(σL), π(b)(1− xˆ)pL,b(σL)}. (8)
Equation (8) is the condition under which signal σ˜R is more valuable than
signal σ˜L in a decision problem of the sort described in Lemma 4 if the
parameter x equals xˆ. Because we have assumed that the two signals are
complementary in all such decision problems, we can deduce from Lemma 1
that inequality (8) holds.
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Next we provide a formula for value differences in decision problems of
the type described in Lemma 4. For this, we introduce some additional
notation and terminology. Consider a decision problem of the type described
in Lemma 4. Denote by d∅ ∈ {T,B} an action that maximizes expected
utility if no signal is available. If both actions are optimal, then we define
d∅ to be T . For any σ1 ∈ S1 we denote by d1(σ1) ∈ {T,B} an action that
maximizes expected utility if only signal σ˜1 is available, and the realization of
that signal is σ1. We apply the same tie breaking rule in favor of T as before.
Finally, for any (σ1, σ2) ∈ S1 × S2. we denote by d1,2(σ1, σ2) ∈ {T,B} an
action that maximizes expected utility if signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are available, and
the realizations of these signals are σ1 and σ2. We again use the tie breaking
rule in favor of T .
Now consider a σ1 ∈ S1. We say that σ1 is critical if qπ(σ1) > 0 and
d1(σ1) 6= d∅. Intuitively, we thus call a realization of σ˜1 critical if it occurs
with positive probability, and if it induces the decision maker to take an
action that is different from the one chosen without information. Likewise,
(σ1, σ2) ∈ S1 × S2 is critical if qπ(σ1, σ2) > 0 and d1,2(σ1, σ2) 6= d1(σ1).
Intuitively, we thus call a realization of (σ˜1, σ˜2) critical if it occurs with
positive probability, and if it induces the decision maker to take an action
that is different from the one chosen if only σ1 were observed.
The following Lemma shows how value differences can be calculated by
focusing on critical signal realizations.
Lemma 5. Consider the symmetric, binary example, and a decision problem
of the type described in Lemma 4. Then:
V1 − V∅ =
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
(qπ(σ1)| qπ(a|σ1)− x|) ,
and
V1,2 − V1 =
∑
(σ1,σ2)∈S1×S2
(σ1,σ2) is critical
(qπ(σ1, σ2)| qπ(a|σ1, σ2)− x|) .
Proof. We only prove the first equation. The second follows by a similar
argument. Observe first that by definition:
V1 − V∅ =
∑
σ1∈S1
∑
s∈S
π(s)ps(σ1)(u(d1(σ1), s)− u(d∅, s)).
32
Clearly, for signal realizations σ1 that are not critical the term in the sum on
the right hand side of this equation is zero. Thus, we can restrict the sum to
critical observations:
V1 − V∅ =
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
∑
s∈S
π(s)ps(σ1)(u(d1(σ1), s)− u(d∅, s)).
Taking into account the payoff structure described in Figure 3, we can spell
out this sum as follows:
V1 − V∅ =
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
d1(σ1)=T
(π(a)pa(σ1)(1− x) + π(b)pb(σ1)(−x))
+
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
d1(σ1)=B
(π(a)pa(σ1)(−(1− x)) + π(b)pb(σ1)x)
=
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
d1(σ1)=T
(π(a)pa(σ1)− qπ(σ1)x))
+
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
d1(σ1)=B
(qπ(σ1)x− π(a)pa(σ1))
=
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
d1(σ1)=T
qπ(σ1) (qπ(a|σ1)− x))
+
∑
σ1∈S1
σ1 is critical
d1(σ1)=B
qπ(σ1) (x− qπ(a|σ1)) .
It becomes obvious that the last expression can also be written in the form
provided in Lemma 5 once one realizes that d1(σ1) = T implies qπ(a|σ1) ≥ x,
and d1(σ1) = B implies qπ(a|σ1) ≤ x.
¿From now on we shall focus on the case that pa(α, βˆ) ≥ pb(α, βˆ). We
shall show that under this assumption, signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are complements
if and only if condition (C2) holds. Identical arguments show that when
pa(α, βˆ) ≤ pb(α, βˆ), the two signals are complements if and only if condition
(C3) holds.
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In the argument that follows, it turns out that the crucial case on which
we need to focus is the case of decision problems for which the threshold x is
between the posterior after receiving signal σ˜1 = β, that is qπ(a|β), and the
prior π (a). In the following lemma, we calculate value differences for this
case.
Lemma 6. Consider the symmetric, binary example. Consider a decision
problem of the type described in Lemma 4, and suppose that x ∈ [qπ(a|β), π(a)].
Then:
V1 − V∅ = qπ(β)(x− qπ(a|β)).
Moreover, if the joint signal realization (α, αˆ) has positive probability in some
state, then:
V1,2 − V1 = qπ(β, αˆ)(qπ(a|β, αˆ)− x) + qπ(α, αˆ)(x− qπ(a|α, αˆ))
+,
where for a real number z, z+ is defined as z if z is positive and as 0 if z is
non-positive. If the joint signal realization (α, αˆ) has probability zero in both
states, then:
V1,2 − V1 = qπ(β, αˆ)(qπ(a|β, αˆ)− x).
Proof. Lemma 6 is a straightforward application of Lemma 5. We therefore
provide a proof only for the second of the three equalities in Lemma 6. The
other two equalities can be shown using similar arguments. To simplify our
arguments, we focus, moreover, on the case that qπ(a|β) < π(a). Thus we
rule out the marginal case that qπ(a|β) = π(a). It is easy to extend our
argument to that case.
To apply Lemma 5 we need to identify the critical joint signal realizations
(σ1, σ2). There are four possible joint signal realizations:
(i) Observation (α, αˆ) is critical if and only if the optimal action condi-
tional on this observation is B, that is, if and only if qπ(a|α, αˆ) < x. This
is because observation (α, αˆ) has in the case that we are considering by as-
sumption positive probability, and because the optimal action is T if only
signal α is received. This explains the second term on the right hand side of
the equality that we are proving.
(ii) Observation (α, βˆ) is not critical because we assumed earlier that:
pa(α, βˆ) ≥ pb(α, βˆ). This implies that the decision maker will choose action
T if observing (α, βˆ). He would have made the same choice had he had only
one observation, namely σ1 = α.
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(iii) Observation (β, αˆ) is critical. As explained in the previous para-
graph, this observation induces the decision maker to choose T , whereas,
with observation σ1 = β alone, the decision maker would have chosen B.
This explains the first term on the right hand side of the equality that we
are proving.
(iv) Observation (β, βˆ) is not critical, because, if the decision maker makes
this observation, he will choose B, the same action that he would have chosen
with one observation σ1 = β alone. To see that the optimal action following
observation (β, βˆ) is B, note that our assumption pa(α, βˆ) ≥ pb(α, βˆ) im-
plies by symmetry: pa(β, αˆ) ≥ pb(β, αˆ). On the other hand, by assumption:
p1,a(β) ≤ p1,b(α). Thus, it follows that: pa(β, βˆ) ≤ pb(β, βˆ), and hence that
the optimal choice following observation (β, βˆ) is B.
The equality that we have to prove is now an immediate implication of
Lemma 5.
We can now conclude our proof with the following Lemma.
Lemma 7. Signals σ˜1 and σ˜2 are complements in all decision problems of
the type described in Lemma 4 if and only if condition (C2) holds.
Proof. Consider first the case in which the joint signal realization (α, αˆ) has
positive probability in at least one state. To prove the “only if”-part of the
claim, note that if the signals are complements in all decision problems of
the type described in Lemma 4, then, in particular, they are complements in
those decision problems in which x = π(a). Using the formulae in Lemma 6,
we find that V1,2 − V1 ≥ V1 − V∅ is equivalent to:
qπ(β, αˆ)(qπ(a|β, αˆ)− π(a)) + qπ(α, αˆ)(π(a)− qπ(a|α, αˆ))
+
≥ qπ(β)(π(a)− qπ(α|β)) (9)
Because the expected value of the posterior equals the prior, we have:
qπ(α)(qπ(a|α)− π(a)) + qπ(β)(qπ(a|β)− π(a)) = 0,
or, equivalently:
qπ(α)(qπ(a|α)− π(a)) = qπ(β)(π(a)− qπ(a|β))
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Applying on the left hand side of this equation again the result that the
expected value of the posterior equals the prior, we obtain:
qπ(α, αˆ)(qπ(a|α, αˆ)− π(a)) + qπ(α, βˆ)(qπ(a|α, βˆ)− π(a))
= qπ(β)(π(a)− qπ(α|β))
Because of symmetry, this is equivalent to:
qπ(α, αˆ)(qπ(a|α, αˆ)− π(a)) + qπ(β, αˆ)(qπ(a|β, αˆ)− π(a))
= qπ(β)(π(a)− qπ(α|β)) (10)
Subtracting (10) from (9), we find:
qπ(α, αˆ)(π(a)− qπ(a|α, αˆ))
+ ≥ qπ(α, αˆ)(qπ(a|α, αˆ)− π(a))⇔
(π(a)− qπ(a|α, αˆ))
+ ≥ qπ(a|α, αˆ)− π(a) (11)
But (11) cannot be true if qπ(a|α, αˆ) > π(a), because then the left hand side
of (11) is zero, and the right hand side is strictly positive. We thus must have
qπ(a|α, αˆ) ≤ π(a), which is equivalent to: pa(α, αˆ) ≤ pb(α, αˆ), i.e. condition
(C2). This completes the proof of the “only if”-part of Lemma 7.
To prove the “if” part of Lemma 7 we fix a prior, and we prove that
V1,2 − V1 ≥ V1 − V∅ holds for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Observe first that for x ∈
[0, qπ(a|β)], and for x ∈ [qπ(a|α), 1], signal σ˜1 has no critical realization. In
the first case, no realization of σ˜1 alone can induce the decision maker to
adopt B rather than T , and in the latter case, no realization of σ˜1 alone can
induce the decision maker to adopt T rather than B. Hence it follows from
Lemma 5 that V1 − V∅ is zero. Thus the assertion is immediate.
Next consider the case that x ∈ (qπ(a|β), π(a)]. From Lemma 6 we know:
(V1,2 − V1)− (V1 − V∅) ≥ qπ(α, βˆ)(qπ(a|α, βˆ)− x) + qπ(β)(qπ(a|β)− x).
Since x ≤ π(a), the difference on the right hand side is not less than:
qπ(α, βˆ)(qπ(a|α, βˆ)− π(a)) + qπ(β)(qπ(a|β)− π(a)),
which by equation (12) is equal to:
qπ(α, αˆ) (π(a)− qπ(a|α, αˆ)) ,
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which is non-negative under condition (C2). Thus, the assertion is shown for
this case.
Consider finally the case that x ∈ [π(a), qπ(a|α)]. Arguments of the type
shown in the proof of Lemma 7 show that in this case, under condition (C2),
the set of critical observations is independent of x. Lemma 5 then implies
that the difference (V1,2−V1)−(V1−V∅) is linear in x. (V1,2−V1)−(V1−V∅) ≥ 0
is then true for all x if and only if it holds for the boundaries: x = π(a), and
x = qπ(a|α). But both boundary cases are covered by arguments provided
above. Thus the claim follows.
It remains to consider the case in which the joint signal realization (α, αˆ)
has zero probability in both states. Clearly, this implies (C2), and hence
the “only if” part of Lemma 7 is trivially true. For the “if” proof, we can
use the same arguments as above, with the only difference that equation (9)
has to be modified because the conditional probability qπ(a|α, αˆ) to which
the equation refers is not well-defined. Instead, the following version of this
equation can be used:
qπ(α, βˆ)(qπ(a|α, βˆ)− π(a)) + qπ(β)(qπ(a|β)− π(a)) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 9
We first define p∗ and k∗ that are referred to in the proposition. This is done
in the next lemma:
Lemma 8. Suppose that the signals are individually informative and (σ˜1, σ˜2)
has full support. Then, there exists a p∗ that solves the following equation in
p:
qπ(b|α, αˆ)− p
p− qπ(b|α, βˆ)
·
qπ(α, αˆ)
qπ(α, βˆ)
=
p− qπ(b|β, αˆ)
qπ(b|β, βˆ)− p
·
qπ(β, αˆ)
qπ(β, βˆ)
,
Moreover, for:
k∗ ≡
qπ(b|α, αˆ)− p
∗
p∗ − qπ(b|α, βˆ)
·
qπ(α, αˆ)
qπ(α, βˆ)
,
it holds that:
• p∗ ∈ (qπ(b|α, βˆ),min{qπ(b|α, αˆ), qπ(b|β, βˆ)}) and k
∗ < 1 if Case 3 ap-
plies;
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• p∗ ∈ (max{qπ(b|α, αˆ), qπ(b|β, βˆ)}, qπ(b|α, βˆ)) and k
∗ > 1 if Case 5 ap-
plies.
Proof. We only consider the case in which Case 3 applies. The other case is
symmetric. Note first that the equation that defines p∗ can be written as:
(qπ(b|α, αˆ)−p)qπ(α, αˆ)(qπ(b|β, βˆ)−p)qπ(β, βˆ)−(p−qπ(b|α, βˆ))
2qπ(α, βˆ)
2 = 0.
By the definition of Case 3, we know that qπ(b|α, βˆ) < qπ(b|α, αˆ), qπ(b|β, βˆ).
To see why there exists a solution to our equation between qπ(b|α, βˆ) and
min{qπ(b|α, αˆ), qπ(b|β, βˆ)} note the following: the left hand side of our equa-
tion is strictly greater than zero when p is equal to the lower bound, it is
strictly less than zero when p is equal to the upper bound and it is strictly
decreasing when p is in between.
Finally, we show that k∗ < 1 if individual signals are informative. To see
why, note that k∗ ≥ 1 implies by definition of k∗ that:
p∗ ≤
∑
σ2∈{αˆ,βˆ}
qπ(b|α, σ2)
qπ(α, σ2)∑
σ′2∈{αˆ,βˆ}
qπ(α, σ′2)
,
and hence that p∗ ≤ qπ(b|α).
Moreover, we can also deduce from the definition of k∗ and p∗ that k∗ ≥ 1
implies that:
p∗ − qπ(b|β, αˆ)
qπ(b|β, βˆ)− p∗
·
qπ(β, αˆ)
qπ(β, βˆ)
≥ 1.
which implies by similar arguments as above that p∗ ≥ qπ(b|β). This contra-
dicts that when individual signals are informative qπ(b|α) < qπ(b|β).
Next, we show that our proposed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium for
the values of k∗ and p∗ given by Lemma 8. Consider first Case 3. We show
that bidder 1 does not have incentives to deviate from our proposed strategy
when σ˜1 = α. Note that according to our proposed equilibrium, bidder 1 bids
p∗ whereas bidder 2 may bid either p∗ or qπ(β, βˆ). Since p
∗ < qπ(β, βˆ) by
Lemma 8, it is sufficient to show: (i) that bidder 1 does not find it profitable
to win the auction when bidder 2 bids qπ(β, βˆ), and (ii) that bidder 1 is
indifferent between winning and losing when bidder 2 also bids p∗.
38
To see why (i) is true, note that bidder 2 bids qπ(β, βˆ) only if she observes
βˆ. Consequently, the conditional expected value of the good in this case is
equal to qπ(α, βˆ), which is less than the bid of bidder 2.
To prove (ii), we show that bidder 1’s expected value of the good condi-
tional on observing α and conditional on bidder 2 bidding p∗ is equal to p∗.
Note that bidder 2 bids p∗ when either she observes αˆ or βˆ. By Bayes’ rule,
the probability that σ˜2 = σ2 ∈ {αˆ, βˆ} when σ˜1 = α and bidder 2 bids p
∗ is
equal to µ2(p
∗|σ2)qpi(α,σ2)P
σ′
2
∈{αˆ,βˆ}
µ2(p∗|σ′2)qpi(α,σ
′
2)
, where µ2(p
∗|σ2) denotes the probability that
bidder 2 bids p∗ when she observes σ2 ∈ S2. Thus, the expected value of the
good conditional on σ˜1 = α and on bidder 2 bidding p
∗ is equal to:
∑
σ2∈{αˆ,βˆ}
qπ(b|α, σ2)
µ2(p
∗|σ2)qπ(α, σ2)∑
σ′2∈{αˆ,βˆ}
µ2(p∗|σ′2)qπ(α, σ
′
2)
.
We now show that this conditional expected value is equal to p∗. To prove
this we replace µ2(p
∗|.) by its corresponding values and subtract p∗, and
obtain the following expression:
(qπ(b|α, αˆ)−p
∗)
qπ(α, αˆ)
qπ(α, αˆ) + k∗qπ(α, βˆ)
+(qπ(b|α, βˆ)−p
∗)
k∗qπ(α, βˆ)
qπ(α, αˆ) + k∗qπ(α, βˆ)
It can easily be seen that the definition of k∗ implies that this expression
equals zero.
Finally, we show that bidder 1 does not have an incentive to deviate when
she observes β. A sufficient condition is that the expected value of the good
conditional on σ˜1 = β and on bidder 2’s bid is equal to bidder 2’s bid for
any possible bid of bidder 2. In this case, bidder 1 gets zero expected utility
if she wins and thus is indifferent between winning and losing. Note that
bidder 2 bids either p∗ or qπ(b|β, βˆ). That our condition is satisfied when
bidder 2 bids qπ(b|β, βˆ) is straightforward. We can show that our condition
also holds true when bidder 2 bids p∗ by a similar argument as the one used
in (ii) above. In this case, we can prove that the corresponding conditional
expected value is equal to p∗ using the following consequence of Lemma 8:
k∗ =
p∗ − qπ(b|β, αˆ)
qπ(b|β, βˆ)− p∗
·
qπ(β, αˆ)
qπ(β, βˆ)
.
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Case 5 is symmetric. The only remarkable difference is that since p∗ >
qπ(b|α, αˆ), bidder 1 may win the auction when she observes β bids p
∗ and
bidder 2 bids qπ(b|α, αˆ). Note that in this case bidder 1 gets strictly positive
expected utility. The reason is that bidder 2 bids qπ(b|α, αˆ) only if she
observes αˆ and in this case the value of the good is equal to qπ(b|β, αˆ) which,
by the definition of Case 5, is greater than bidder 2’s bid.
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